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CHASING THE ILLUSORY POT OF GOLD
AT THE END OF THE RAINBOW:
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY IN
DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION
AARON D. TWERSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
It may be our fault. When drafting the design defect standard of
liability for the Products Liability Restatement,' advisors importuned
my co-reporter, Jim Henderson, and me to simply state that a product
was defectively designed if the manufacturer had acted negligently, i.e.
had not acted reasonably in designing the product. In deciding whether
the conduct of a manufacturer was reasonable, the fact-finder would
assess the risk-utility tradeoffs between the alternative design suggested
by the plaintiff that would have avoided the plaintiff's harm and the
product as marketed. Instead of articulating the standard in classic
negligence terminology, we chose to adopt a functional test for defect
that predicates liability "when the foreseeable risks of harm ... could
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design.",2 Our critics believed that it was more honest to
frankly acknowledge that common law negligence principles govern
design defect litigation.3 We championed a functional test for defect
* Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B., 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon
Talmudic Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee; J.D., 1965,
Marquette University Law School.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
2. See id. § 2(b) ("A product is... defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe .... ).
3. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 355 (2000) ("[C]ourts have now
generally adopted a risk-utility test to determine whether a harmful design is also a defective
design. When a risk-utility test is applied, the courts seem to be requiring negligence or at
least some similar species of fault."); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon
Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 654 ("[C]ourts have had to expend
considerable energy trying to explain how defectiveness under the risk-utility test differs from
negligence. The effort has been far from successful."); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict
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that made no mention of any particular doctrine. Neither negligence,
strict liability, nor the implied warranty of merchantability are
mentioned in the black letter rule.4 We prevailed, but our critics may
yet have the last laugh.
What brings this confessional to the fore is a recent decision by the
Illinois Supreme Court, Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc.5 In
truth, I believe the case was correctly decided. I cannot help but be
gratified that, between the majority and concurring opinions, the court
cited thirty times to the Products Liability Restatement. But, with it all,
there are some significant glitches in the opinion, all produced by the
belief that a design case sounding in strict products liability must be
different than one sounding in negligence. Our critics must be laughing
(or crying) in their beers. With some justification they should be saying
"We told you so. That is the price you pay for not being brutally
honest." For reasons that I will explain later in this Article I believe
that adopting the functional test for design defect liability was probably
correct. But, I must admit that the critics' desire for brutal honesty
seems more alluring as time goes on.
II. THE BLUE STORY
Blue is a rather run-of-the-mill design defect case. Plaintiff, Glen
Blue, injured himself while working on a heavy-duty trash compactor.6
Blue had placed a large sofa box into the compactor when it stopped
and would not crush the box. In order to facilitate the crushing, he
pushed his leg into the box so that the ram would come down and grab
it. Blue's "foot became caught in the box and [he] was pulled into the
compactor as the ram took hold of the box."7 The ram subsequently hit
Blue "three times, breaking his pelvis, leg and foot."8 Plaintiff's expert
testified to several safety features that were technologically available at
the time the compactor was manufactured that would have averted
plaintiff's injury, and he opined that the compactor was negligently
Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 824 (1992) ("Products designs are currently regulated
under a negligence test: a design is defective if, in the opinion of a jury, the design creates
risks in excess of benefits."). Although these comments came before and after the
promulgation of the Products Liability Restatement, they reflect the views of many that were
presented to us when we were drafting the Restatement.
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
5. 828 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 2005).
6. Id. at 1134.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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designed because of the absence of these safety features.'
Plaintiff's complaint alleged counts in strict liability and negligence."°
The strict liability count was dismissed because the case was "filed
beyond the applicable limitations period and the statute of repose.""
The jury returned a general verdict against the manufacturer on the
negligence count and found the plaintiff to be thirty-two percent
contributorily negligent.12  The jury also responded to a special
interrogatory. Over the plaintiff's objection, the jury was asked, "Was
the risk of injury by sticking a foot over or through a gate into a moving
compactor open and obvious?"" The jury answered in the affirmative."
After the trial, the defendant moved for judgment based on the special
interrogatory claiming that a finding that the risk was open and obvious
controlled over the finding that the defendant was negligent. 5 In the
defendant's view, it could not be found negligent for designing a
machine with risks that were open and obvious. The trial court granted
defendant's motion and entered judgment in favor of defendant. 6 On
appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court.'7
The intermediate appellate court held that the fact that a danger was
open and obvious did not preclude a finding that the compactor was
negligently designed. 8 It also found that there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding that the compactor failed to meet risk-utility
standards since the plaintiff's expert had shown that there were several
safety features available at the time the compactor was manufactured
that could have been incorporated into the compactor and would have
avoided the plaintiff's injury.' 9
If this were all there were to the case, it would hardly deserve
attention. The patent danger (or open and obvious danger) rule has
been moribund for decades.2  The Products Liability Restatement
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1133.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1135.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 803 N.E.2d 187 (11. App. Ct. 2003).
18. Id. at 198.
19. See id. at 198-99.
20. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571,577-78 (N.Y. 1976).
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found that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions reject it in cases
based on defective design. 2' A product with open and obvious dangers
may still present risks to those who through their inadvertence or
impulsive conduct encounter the patent danger. If a safety feature that
eliminates the risk can reasonably be adopted, then there is no reason
that liability should be denied.2 ' As to the sufficiency of the evidence,
there appeared to be ample expert testimony to support a finding of
design defect.23 The case seemed to call for nothing more than a routine
affirmance by the Illinois Supreme Court of the intermediate appellate
court decision reinstating the plaintiff's verdict.
The Illinois Supreme Court did, in fact, affirm and reinstate the
plaintiff's verdict, but in doing so wrote an opinion that, in many ways, is
mystifying. It has needlessly complicated the law of products liability.
Illinois courts do not stand alone. Other courts have floundered on
similar issues. It is time to set the record straight.
III. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT OPINION
Before addressing the Illinois Supreme Court opinion, I need to
make a disclaimer. It is beyond the scope of this Article to comment on
a host of product liability issues that are mentioned in the opinion.
Issues such as the role of the consumer expectations test in design defect
litigation;24 who should bear the burden of proof on the issue of
defective design; 25 whether the exceptions to the open and obvious
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, subpart
IV.C (1998).
22. See id.
23. The recitation of the evidence of reasonable alternative designs was more than
ample to sustain a plaintiff's verdict. See Blue, 803 N.E.2d at 199.
24. Illinois allows recovery in a design defect case when a product fails to meet
consumer expectations or when a product fails to meet the risk-utility test. Blue v. Envtl.
Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1138 (Il. 2005) (citing Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764
N.E.2d 35, 43-46 (Ill. 2002)). Presumably, the obvious nature of the defect would have barred
the plaintiff in Blue under the consumer expectations test. The Illinois Supreme Court
appropriately held that the obvious nature of the defect did not bar the plaintiff on the risk-
utility prong. Id. at 1146. As to when the consumer expectations test is appropriate in a
design defect case, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 872-76, 879-82, 889-90 (1998).
25. In Wortel v. Somerset Industries, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1219, 1223 (Il. App. Ct.
2002), the court noted that Illinois was one of three states that shifted the burden on risk-
utility tradeoffs to the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court in Blue rejected that view and
now holds that, whether a design defect claim sounds in negligence or strict liability, a
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the product is defectively designed. Blue, 828 N.E.2d at
1143. In doing so, the court expressly agreed with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998).
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danger rule in premises liability cases should be applicable to design
defect cases;16 and whether a "simple machine" exception should bar
liability27 are all discussed in the opinion and will not be addressed in the
ensuing discussion.
As noted earlier, the plaintiff's strict liability claim was dismissed on
statute of limitations grounds. The court thus turned its attention to
whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of negligence in
the design of the product. In order to answer this question, the court
had to determine the meaning of negligence in a products liability
setting. The court began its analysis with an extensive discussion of
section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement that sets forth the
standard for defective design.28 It provides:
A product.., is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.29
The court notes that the comments to the Products Liability
Restatement make it clear that whether a proposed alternative design is
reasonable depends on risk-utility balancing no different than that
endemic to the classic test for negligence articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 291 through 293.0 But then the court goes on
to argue that there are several differences between strict liability and
26. Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1147. Given the fact that the court held that the open and
obvious nature of a product defect is not a bar to recovery under either negligence or strict
liability, the issue of whether to apply the premises liability exception to products liability
cases is moot in any event. See id. at 1148.
27. The court recognizes that under both negligence and strict liability the open and
obvious nature of a danger may in some instances bar a plaintiff from recovering. Id. at 1144-
46 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, subpart IV.C
(1998)). The court opined that a court may have to confront the question as to whether a
machine is so simple that there is no duty to design against a defect. Id. at 1148-50. In Blue,
the defendant failed to raise the duty issue in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 1151. The duty issue is solely for the court to decide as a matter of law. Id.
at 1148, 1150. Since the defendant failed to raise the issue below, it was not preserved on
appeal. Id. at 1151.
28. Id. at 1139-40.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
30. Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1440.
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negligence in a product design defect case. They bear careful
examination.
A. The Product-Conduct Distinction Under Risk-Utility Balancing
Although the court admits that a design defect claim is more akin to
a negligence claim than one for strict liability, it says that "[a]ny
difference between the two would lie in the fault concept. In a defective
design case sounding in negligence, the focus is on the conduct of the
defendant, but in a strict liability defective design case, the focus is on
the product."3
If risk-utility tradeoffs are to be utilized to decide whether a design is
defective, then there is no difference between negligence and strict
liability. The Products Liability Restatement test requiring a
"comparison between an alternative design and the product design that
caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person,"32 is the identical test utilized in deciding whether a defendant
was negligent. In both, a fact-finder must determine whether a
reasonable person would find that the product did not meet the
reasonableness standard. That hypothetical reasonable person stands in
judgment of the manufacturer in negligence cases and decides not
whether a "reasonable manufacturer" would have adopted the proposed
design alternative, but whether a "reasonable person" reflecting the
values of society would have adopted the alternative design. The
decision whether to adopt an alternative design must be decided by an
objective, reasonable person. Robots do not make design decisions,
human designers do. Juries sit in judgment on those decisions and do so
from an objective perspective. There simply is no difference between
reviewing the conduct of the manufacturer and the product design.
Ultimately, products are neither reasonable nor unreasonable; they are
deemed so only because a human fact-finder utilizing risk-utility
tradeoffs decides one way or another on the issue.33
31. Id. at 1141(citations omitted).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
33. The court in Blue cites to section 1, comment a, of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY to the effect that some courts prefer to impose liability for
strict liability rather than negligence in design defect cases because negligence
might allow a finding that a defendant with meager resources was not
negligent because it was too burdensome for such a defendant to discover
risks or to design or warn against them. The concept of strict liability,
which focuses on the product rather than the conduct of the manufacturer,
[90:7
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B. Does Risk- Utility Balancing Determine Defective Design Under
Negligence?
The Illinois Supreme Court split on the issue of whether risk-utility
balancing should be used to determine defect when a products liability
case is brought in negligence. No single view carried a majority of the
court.' The view of the plurality that risk-utility balancing does not
apply to a products liability design defect case brought under a
negligence theory is beset by some fundamental problems.35 It is clear
that in non-products cases risk-utility balancing is the operative theory
for determining whether conduct is negligent.3 6  Illinois case law is
replete with decisions to that effect, and the court acknowledges that at
the outset of its discussion.37 The court begins its analysis on this issue
by saying that "a plaintiff raising a negligence claim must do more than
simply allege a better design for the product; he must plead and prove
evidence of a standard of care by which to measure a defendant's design
and establish a deviation from that standard."3 This statement standing
alone is perfectly consistent with the standard for defective design set
forth in section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement. If a product
may help make the point that a defendant is held to the expert standard of
knowledge available to the relevant manufacturing community at the time
the product was manufactured.
Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1140 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 1 cmt. a (1998)). In setting forth this view expressed by some courts, we did not intend to
endorse it as a proper concern. In an article published prior to the Products Liability
Restatement project we said:
Concern that a negligence standard may be too forgiving is clearly
misplaced. The law of negligence is based on the hypothetical reasonable
person. The test is objective; subjective factors peculiar to individual
defendants generally do not excuse liability. Moreover, manufacturers
are held to the standard of investigation and knowledge of an expert in
the field. Thus, courts already have a specific rule, devised long ago in
negligence law, to assure that ignorance will not be excused where
information was reasonably attainable by those with sophisticated
expertise.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 276 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
34. See Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1151 (Freeman, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 1142 (plurality opinion).
36. See, e.g., McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying Illinois law); Deibert v. Bauer Bros. Constr. Co., 566 N.E.2d 239, 243 (I11. 990);
Fancher v. Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co., 664 N.E.2d 692, 696 (I11. App. 1996) (citing Deibert, 566
N.E.2d at 243).
37. Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1140.
38. Id. at 1141.
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is to be declared defective in design, it is because there was, at the time
of sale, an alternative design that should have been adopted, against
which the injury-causing product can be measured.
The court, however, citing to two earlier cases, goes on to say that
to establish a negligence claim for a defective design of a
product, a plaintiff must prove that either (1) the
defendant deviated from the standard of care that other
manufacturers in the industry followed at the time the
product was designed, or (2) that the defendant knew or
should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care, that
the product was unreasonably dangerous and defendant
failed to warn of its dangerous propensity."
Any doubt as to what the court meant is dispelled in the next
paragraph when the court says:
In contrast to negligence's focus on the standard of care
established by other manufacturers in the industry, strict
liability focuses on the product and only requires proof
that the benefits of the challenged design do not
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs, that
the alternative design would have prevented the injury,
and that the alternative design was feasible in terms of
cost, practicality and technology.'n
In short, to make out a case under negligence, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant failed to meet existing industry standards. Compliance
with such standards appears to be an absolute defense.
Why the Illinois court adopted a rule in product design cases that
requires a plaintiff alleging negligence to prove that the defendant failed
to conform to industry custom is puzzling. It is black letter law
throughout the country that conformance to industry custom is not
dispositive on the issue of negligence vel non.4" Industry custom is
relevant but rarely binding as to whether an actor acted with reasonable
care. This hoary rule is set forth in both the Second and Third
Restatement of Torts,4" is endorsed by all the major commentators, 3
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1142 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 164-65.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13(a)
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and is the law in Illinois itself." Compliance with custom is often raised
by a defendant as evidence that the defendant acted reasonably. The
plaintiff usually counters with a proposed standard of care that is
superior to that of customary conduct. Only when the industry custom
is beyond reproach will a court direct a verdict for defendants;
otherwise, the issue is for the jury.45
Once rid of the myth that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
departed from industry standards to establish a negligence case for
defective product design, the Illinois court has no alternative but to
resort to risk-utility balancing to determine whether a defendant
breached the standard of care. And as the previous section
demonstrates, once risk-utility balancing is required, the product-
conduct distinction is totally illusory.
It would appear that under a risk-utility balancing test, the plaintiff
in Blue presented adequate expert testimony that a reasonable
alternative design was available when the compactor was designed in
1975. Notwithstanding the industry custom, the jury was entitled to
conclude that the defendant did not act reasonably when it failed to
adopt the suggested alternative design. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the finding of negligence because the defendant
did not timely object to the jury finding in its post-trial motions, the
Illinois Supreme Court needlessly drew an illegitimate distinction
between negligence and strict liability in design defect products liability
cases. What is worse, it gave voice to an absolute "industry custom" bar
for a design defect case brought under a negligence theory.
C. Is There a Foreseeability Requirement in Design Defect Litigation?
In a concurring opinion, Justice Fitzgerald leaves open the question
of whether risk-utility balancing applies in a design defect case
predicated on a negligence theory. 6 Instead, Justice Fitzgerald sees the
distinction between strict liability and negligence in design defect cases
as being dependent upon the requirement that a risk be foreseeable.
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965).
43. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33 (5th ed. 1984).
44. E.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965);
McNealy v. I11. Cent. R.R., 193 N.E.2d 879, 885 (I11. App. Ct. 1963).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A, cmt. b (1965).
46. Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1152 (I11. 2005) (Fitzgerald, J.,
concurring).
47. Id. at 1153-54.
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A case brought in negligence requires foreseeability of harm; in strict
liability, scienter plays no role. Justice Fitzgerald correctly notes that
section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement imposes liability only
when risks are foreseeable.48
He further notes that in an earlier Illinois case the court put off
deciding whether to adopt the Restatement's foreseeability requirement
in strict liability design defect until a case comes before the court that
appropriately raises the issue. 9 Justice Fitzgerald eschews making the
decision on foreseeability in the instant case since plaintiff's claim for
strict liability was barred by the statute of limitations."
The issue of whether a plaintiff must establish foreseeability of risk
in a strict liability design defect case remains undecided in Illinois.
When a case is predicated on a failure-to-warn strict liability theory,
Illinois law is clear. In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., the Illinois
Supreme Court said:
We perceive that requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove
that the defendant manufacturer knew or should have
known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the
defendant manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that
danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one which
focuses on the nature of the product and on the adequacy
of the warning, rather than on the conduct of the
manufacturer."
48. See id. at 1154.
49. Id. at 1153; see Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (I11. 2002).
The Hansen court declined to address the issue of whether the risk-utility test includes a
"foreseeability" requirement, in the context of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODucrS LIABILITY, section 6 (1998), which deals with design defects in prescription drugs
and medical devices. Presumably, if a court mandated a "foreseeability" requirement for
prescription drugs and medical devices, it would do so for all products covered under section
2, which sets forth the rules governing design liability for non-drug related products. One
cannot, however, be certain because courts have taken a more lenient view, exempting drug
products from the strictures of strict liability. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§402A cmt. k (1965).
50. Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1152 (Fitzgerald, J., concurring).
51. 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980). In failure to warn cases, the overwhelming majority
of courts require foreseeability of risk as a predicate to imposing strict liability. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991) (en banc)
(holding that "knowledge, actual or constructive, is a requisite for strict liability for failure to
warn"); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 721 (D.C. 1985); Olson v. Prosoco,
Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994); Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324
(Kan. 1986); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-24 (Mass. 1998)
(overruling prior case law and adopting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
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The court goes on to say that imposing a requirement that the
manufacturer know or should know of the dangerous propensity of a
product
is justified because a logical limit must be placed on the
scope of a manufacturer's liability under a strict liability
theory. To hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn
of a danger of which it would be impossible to know...
would make the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the
product.52
The court in Woodill left open the question of whether there is a
foreseeability requirement in a design defect case." Twenty-six years
later it still remains an open question in Illinois.
Why there should be a difference between a case based on failure-
to-warn and design defect is a mystery. If it is unfair to impose liability
in a failure-to-warn case because a risk was unknowable and therefore
could not be warned against, it is equally unfair to impose liability for
failing to design against an unknowable risk.54 As the comments to the
Products Liability Restatement point out, in most cases where plaintiffs
allege a design defect in a mechanical product, it is rare that the risk of
harm is unknowable." In drug failure-to-warn cases, defendants may
legitimately claim that it may take decades to discover latent risks.16
LIABILITY (1998) foreseeability requirement for strict liability for failure-to-warn); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 640 (Md. 1992); Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 615,
618 (App. Div. 1982). But see Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997)
("[E]vidence that a manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable human
foresight should have known of the dangers inherent in his product is irrelevant.").
52. Woodill, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
53. Id.
54. The notion that there is no scienter requirement in strict liability cases had its origin
in articles written by two seminal scholars in the field of products liability. See Page Keeton,
Products Liability - The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 702; John
W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 15 (1965). Both authors
repudiated their early views. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, at 697-98; John W. Wade,
On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 734, 761 (1983). Professor David Owen notes that many courts continue to profess
allegiance to the Wade-Keeton test imputing knowledge of unforeseeable risks while knowing
that most of the major commentators have rejected that view. In a pithy conclusion,
Professor Owen states, "The ghost of the Wade-Keeton test continues to haunt judicial halls,
but its time has come and gone." DAVID G. OWEN, PRODucTs LIABILITY LAW § 8.7 (2005).
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1998).
56. See id.
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Thus, as a practical matter, it is more likely that foreseeability of risk
will be a real problem in some failure-to-warn cases. But, it is not
impossible that foreseeability of risk will be a problem in a design defect
case. When it does arise, the issue should be treated in a similar fashion.
IV. LOOKING FOR THE ILLUSORY POT OF GOLD
If the analysis set forth above makes good sense, then we are faced
with the question as to why the Illinois Supreme Court and some other
courts have written opinions in the area of design defect seeking to
differentiate strict liability from negligence with distinctions that are
spurious at best. The answer is, I believe, relatively simple. With the
adoption of section 402A, the courts embraced the theory of strict
liability for defective products. The focus in the early years of section
402A was on manufacturing defect cases. Defining defect for
manufacturing cases was not complex. A product is defective if it
departs from the manufacturer's intended design.17  It makes no
difference whether the manufacturer exercised all reasonable care in the
preparation and marketing of the product. Manufacturing defects are
rare events, and the implications for imposing strict liability were not
serious. As many have noted, liberal use of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur under negligence allowed plaintiffs to recover. 8 The shift to
strict liability went smoothly.
Having adopted a theory of strict liability, courts were then faced
with the question of how strict liability could be applied to design defect
and failure-to-warn cases. They reasoned that there must be some
comparative advantage in advancing a strict liability theory. Unless a
court is prepared to apply a consumer expectations test totally devoid of
risk-utility balancing, there really is no difference between strict liability
and negligence. Risk-utility balancing lies at the heart of negligence,
and switching labels to strict liability does not change matters.
In the search to find some difference, courts have said some very
strange things: (1) Illinois, as noted earlier, has said that negligent design
of products is not risk-utility based but requires proof that a defendant
57. Id. § 2 cmt. c.
58. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960) ("Where the action is against the manufacturer
of the product, an honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred
in which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not."); JAMES A.
HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUcTS LIABILITY, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS
23 (2004).
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departed from industry custom.59 In doing so, it needlessly tortured
classic negligence law. (2) Illinois courts and other courts have said that
negligence focuses on the conduct of the specific manufacturer and
might absolve the manufacturer of liability if it acted reasonably
according to its own evaluation of risk, whereas strict liability looks to
the risk information available to the industry.60 This too is gross error.
An expert is always held to information that is available to the industry
and cannot absolve itself with the argument that it acted reasonably
based on its own assessment of risk.61 (3) Still others have said that
there is no scienter requirement in design defect cases, but there can be
no finding of liability in failure-to-warn cases without establishing that a
risk is foreseeable.62
It is high time that these irrational distinctions be wiped away. They
complicate the law without reason. Not only are they irrational, they
are downright harmful. If Blue stands as the law in Illinois, a plaintiff
bringing his suit in negligence will not be able to mount a case without
proving violation of industry custom. Furthermore, by insisting that
there are differences between negligence and strict liability in design
defect cases, we encourage plaintiffs to bring suit under both theories.
Not infrequently, plaintiffs bring suit under both theories and a jury
finds that the product is not defective but that the defendant was
negligent. Most courts have found that such verdicts are inconsistent
and require a retrial.63 And the courts that have found such jury verdicts
to be consistent have had to resort to warped reasoning to sustain their
conclusion."
Enough is enough. Courts ought not to insist that negligence and
strict liability are similar in design defect cases with regard to the core
definition of defect and then fumble to find a nonsensical distinction. If
then you ask why did we not, as reporters, simply say that design defect
litigation is predicated on negligence and that strict liability was a
mirage, I would answer that many courts are so committed to the
59. See discussion supra Part III.B.
60. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991) (en
banc); see discussion supra note 54.
61. See, e.g., 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (2d ed. 1986).
62. See OWEN, supra note 54, §§ 8.7 n.39, 9.2 n.11.
63. See, e.g., Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying
Kentucky law); Garrett v. Hamilton Standard Controls, Inc., 850 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying Texas law). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2
cmt. n (1998).
64. See Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying New
Hampshire law); Greiten v. LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Wis. 1975).
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language of strict liability for design and failure-to-warn that we believe
it preferable to state the test for defect functionally rather than enter
into a squabble with the courts as to which doctrinal label to paste on
the test for defect. Our point is that either label is acceptable, so long as
the labels are not allowed to obscure the fact that the substance is the
same in either case.
Furthermore, issues such as the applicability of comparative fault
and liability for non-manufacturing sellers were seen to depend on
whether a case was brought under negligence or strict liability.65 But,
our critics are right that we paid a price for doing so. Though we
imposed a functional test for defect, courts had gotten used to the
doctrinal strict liability-negligence dichotomy and looked for some
wiggle room to differentiate the two. By not tackling the doctrinal issue
head on, we may have missed an opportunity to clarify the law.
V. CONCLUSION
I begin my Products Liability course every year by telling my
students that perhaps there should be no independent course called
Products Liability. Fundamental first-year tort principles will serve
them well. With the exception of manufacturing defects, products
liability is based on fundamental concepts of negligence. Whenever
they encounter decisional law that sounds like it creates a separate
doctrine for products liability, it is most often wrong. If courts were to
stick to the basics, they would serve themselves and the practicing bar
well. If we can make it easy, why should we make it difficult?
65. Satellite issues may be affected by whether a case sounds in strict liability or
negligence. For example, most courts allow comparative fault as a defense to a products
liability claim brought under strict liability; a minority of courts do not. See Webb v. Navistar
Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343 (Vt. 1997) (discussing and analyzing policies and case law on
both sides of the question.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§
2(b), 17 cmt.a (1998). Furthermore, whether a non-manufacturing seller can be held liable for
selling a defective product may also depend on whether the case is brought under negligence
or strict liability. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt.
e (1998). Even if courts feel compelled to decide the satellite issues based on whether a case
is brought in negligence or strict liability, they are still free to adopt the negligence/risk-utility
framework for the core issue of defect.
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